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A B S T R A C T
Few medical schools and sustained emigration have led to low numbers of doctors in many sub-Saharan African
countries. The opportunity to undertake specialty training has been shown to be particularly important in re-
taining doctors. Yet limited training capacity means that doctors are often sent to other countries to specialise,
increasing the risk that they may not return. Expanding domestic training, however, may be constrained by the
reluctance of doctors to accept training in their home country. We modelled diﬀerent policy options in an
example country, Malawi, to examine the cost-eﬀectiveness of expanding specialty training to retain doctors in
sub-Saharan Africa. We designed a Markov model of the physician labour market in Malawi, incorporating data
from graduate tracing studies in 2006 and 2012, a 2013 discrete choice experiment on 148 Malawian doctors
and 2015 cost data. A government perspective was taken with a time horizon of 40 years. Expanded specialty
training in Malawi or South Africa with increasing mandatory service before training was compared against
baseline conditions. The outcome measures were cost per doctor-year and cost per specialist-year spent working
in the Malawian public sector. Expanding specialty training in Malawi is more cost-eﬀective than training
outside Malawi. At least two years of mandatory service would be more cost-eﬀective, with ﬁve years adding the
most value in terms of doctor-years. After 40 years of expanded specialty training in Malawi, the medical
workforce would be over ﬁfty percent larger with over six times the number of specialists compared to current
trends. However, the government would need to be willing to pay at least 3.5 times more per doctor-year for a
5% increase and a third more per specialist-year for a four-fold increase. Greater returns are possible from
doctors with more ﬂexible training preferences. Sustained funding of specialty training may improve retention in
sub-Saharan Africa.
1. Introduction
Low production and high emigration have led to few doctors in
many sub-Saharan African countries, impeding the delivery of essential
health services and response to new health threats (Sidibé and
Campbell, 2015; World Health Organization, 2006, 2015). Retaining
doctors in their country of training, therefore, has been the focus of
recent policy eﬀorts. Out of possible incentives, the opportunity to
specialise has been found to be particularly important to doctors
(George et al., 2007; Mandeville et al., 2014a; Willis-Shattuck et al.,
2008). Yet the specialist workforce is also small in many of these
countries, constraining domestic training capacity and forcing countries
to send doctors to other countries to specialise (Mullan et al., 2011).
The opportunity to train in more advanced health systems is often
popular with doctors, but augments the risk of emigration. This pre-
sents a dilemma for policymakers: sending doctors to train in other
countries is likely to increase retention of doctors in the short-term, but
may produce specialists more likely to emigrate in the long-term. Sti-
pulating a mandatory period of work before entry to specialty training
would ensure better value from this investment, but delay the
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production of much-needed specialists. Expanding domestic training
may protect against emigration of specialists through the strengthening
of personal and professional ties, but may not be accepted by doctors if
external training is a possibility. Finally, many countries will be unable
to reduce their dependence on foreign-trained specialists without ex-
pansion of specialty training, yet specialists are costlier to produce and
employ than generalist doctors.
To aid decision-making in this area, a formal comparison of the
costs and eﬀects of diﬀerent policy options would be appropriate. Such
economic evaluations, however, have been rarely employed in health
workforce policy to date. Only one study, to our knowledge, has used
decision analytical modelling to evaluate the cost-eﬀectiveness of dif-
ferent health workforce policies (Lagarde et al., 2012). One key theo-
retical issue that may have limited empirical studies is this area is the
value of health workers. Despite numerous attempts to correlate health
worker density with health service or population health outcomes, the
relationship between population health and the availability of health
workers remains ill-deﬁned (Anand and Barnighausen, 2004, 2007;
Castillo-Laborde, 2011; Cochrane et al., 1997; Hertz et al., 1994; Kim
and Moody, 1992; Robinson and Wharrad, 2000, 2001; Speybroeck
et al., 2006). In contrast to clinical or public health interventions,
therefore, it is more diﬃcult to express the eﬀects of health workforce
policies in outcomes such as life-years gained or mortality averted. Yet
for national decision-makers seeking to make the best use of limited
budgets with the existing health workforce, the most important out-
come in the timeframe of the decision is maximising clinical contact
over the population, with the most natural unit being clinician-time.
Indeed, the study mentioned above uses the outcome of ‘rural nurse-
years’ (the number of years worked by a nurse in a rural health facility)
to evaluate diﬀerent policies to recruit and retain nurses in rural areas
over their working life (Lagarde et al., 2012). As more deﬁnitive evi-
dence becomes available on the relationship between density of health
workers and population health, it may be possible to move to more
downstream outcomes.
Such dynamic modelling and economic evaluation of diﬀerent
policy options are particularly well suited to health workforce decisions
in low- and middle-income countries (LMIC) (Lagarde and Cairns, 2012;
Mandeville et al. 2016a). For many cadres of health worker, the lag
between training investment and labour production means that costs
and eﬀects can only be fully evaluated over the long-term. Training and
retaining health workers also consumes considerable resources from
limited budgets. For example, out of its 2014/2015 health budget, the
Malawian government spent around 4% on training and 36% on sal-
aries (Ministry of Health data). Decisions on health workforce policy
are therefore high value, yet usually made in a low-information en-
vironment. Indeed, another constraint on the use of economic evalua-
tions in this area is the lack of evidence on the eﬀectiveness of diﬀerent
policies, compounded by a general paucity of data on health workforce
dynamics in LMIC for model inputs. Recognition of this issue has led to
increasing use of discrete choice experiments, a survey method that
quantiﬁes the preferences of health workers by asking them to make
choices between jobs oﬀering diﬀerent conditions (Mandeville et al.,
2014a). These stated preferences can then be used as a guide to the
uptake and thus eﬀectiveness of diﬀerent policies in economic evalua-
tions (Terris-Prestholt et al., 2016) Although revealed preferences de-
rived from experimental studies would be ideal, these types of studies
are diﬃcult to undertake with centralised workforces. Moreover, ob-
servational data of actual labour market decisions may not accurately
reﬂect preferences where available job options are constrained, as in
many LMIC health labour markets. Discrete choice experiments, in
contrast, enable comparison of both existing and potential policies and
are therefore provide a useful measure of policy eﬀectiveness in this
context.
To further the empirical literature in this area, this study models the
medical workforce in an example country, Malawi, to assess the cost-
eﬀectiveness of diﬀerent specialty training policy interventions.
Following the approach of the previous study (Lagarde et al., 2012), we
use the outcome measure of doctor-years, deﬁned as the number of
years worked by doctors in the Malawian public sector. We employ the
results of a previous discrete choice experiment to estimate the eﬀec-
tiveness of interventions, as well as tracing studies of Malawian medical
graduates to estimate transition probabilities (Mandeville et al., 2014b,
2016b; Zijlstra and Broadhead, 2007).
2. Study setting
In Malawi, which has one doctor for every 53,000 people, a national
medical school was established in 1991 (Broadhead and Muula, 2002;
Muula and Broadhead, 2001; World Health Organization, 2015). In
2005, concerns over the continuing low numbers of doctors led to a
tripling of medical students at the College of Medicine-University of
Malawi (COM), but no proportionate increase in the number of speci-
alty training places available (Management Sciences for Health, 2010).
The vast majority of medical students and junior doctors still intend to
specialise, raising concerns that they may emigrate if training oppor-
tunities are not available in Malawi (Mandeville et al., 2012). Indeed,
more specialists are needed in Malawi, with many budgeted public
sector posts across all specialties vacant. For example, in 2014, there
were just ten ophthalmologists in Malawi, seven of whom were Mala-
wian (Schulze Schwering et al., 2014). Limited national capacity for
specialty training, however, means that some or all training for certain
specialties is undertaken in South Africa and other African countries.
Yet historically those doctors who specialise outside Malawi have been
far less likely to remain in Malawi (Muula, 2009; Muula and Broadhead,
2001; Zijlstra and Broadhead, 2007). Where training can be provided in
Malawi, junior doctors have been reluctant to take this up due to
concerns over transferability of training, remuneration during training
and the perceived quality of training in a resource-poor setting (Bailey
et al., 2012; Sawatsky et al., 2014).
3. Methods
Following Lagarde and Cairns (Lagarde and Cairns, 2012), we used
a Markov model to develop a simpliﬁed model of the prevailing labour
market for Malawian doctors (Fig. 1). In this model, a doctor can be in
one of a limited number of mutually exclusive states, which represent
jobs in the Malawian public sector or a position outside it. A Markov
process was used to model the movement of doctors over their working
lifetime. This is essentially a closed hierarchical system, where doctors
enter at the most junior level and can only transition to more senior
states. At the end of each cycle in the model (set to one year), a doctor
can transition to another state.
To identify all relevant costs and consequences, the time horizon is
the working life of a doctor in Malawi. The mean age of newly grad-
uated doctors in Malawi is 24 years and the mandatory retirement age
for both sexes in the public sector is 55 years (Government of Malawi,
2011; Management Sciences for Health, 2010; Muula and Maseko,
2005). The working life of many doctors, however, has been extended
past this age using repeated ﬁxed-term contracts to boost retention
(Management Sciences for Health, 2010). Given this higher eﬀective
retirement age and likely increases in the mandatory retirement age
over the lifetime of new graduates, the time horizon was set as 40 years.
The perspective taken is that of the Malawian government. As the
government pays the salaries of Malawian doctors working in rural
health facilities run by faith-based organisations, these doctors are also
considered to be working in the public sector.
As outlined above, we used the outcome measure of doctor-years,
deﬁned as the number of years worked by qualiﬁed medical doctors in
the Malawian public sector. Not all doctor-years are of the same value,
however, and in order to distinguish doctors with higher levels of
human capital, we also measured specialist-years: the number of years
worked by qualiﬁed medical specialists in the Malawian public sector.
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The baseline scenario represents the current situation in Malawi with
limited training places available and estimates the cumulative impact
on the outcome measures if there is no change in training policy. The
alternatives examine the impact of diﬀerent policy interventions that
expand specialty training. This training varies in location and in the
requirement to complete a mandatory service period of two to ﬁve
years before training (see below).
3.1. Description of states
States can be temporary (entered but eventually left) or absorbing
(entered but never left). Our model consisted of ten temporary states
and three absorbing states that reﬂect three types of exit from the public
sector. The ﬁrst, “exit Malawi”, encompasses doctors who have left
Malawi to work or train outside of government training programmes. In
addition, all doctors who have left Malawi for specialty training not
funded by the government are assumed to remain outside Malawi. The
“exit health labour market” state incorporates retirement, death and
doctors who have changed professions or decided not to work. For
tractability, we have not modelled doctors who temporarily leave the
labour market to raise children. The “exit public sector” includes all
doctors working exclusively in private practice or for commercial
companies, non-governmental organisations or research/teaching in-
stitutions. A matrix of all transition probabilities between states is in-
cluded in the technical appendix, along with more detail on their es-
timation and initial values.
Doctors enter the model in the “intern” state. All medical graduates
in Malawi have to complete an 18-month internship in the public sector
in order to gain full registration with the Medical Council of Malawi
(Muula and Maseko, 2005). For simplicity, we have modelled this as a
temporary state lasting one cycle.
All doctors then move to the “medical oﬃcer” state unless they
enter one of the absorbing states. The probabilities of exiting the public
sector and outside Malawi from the intern state were informed by a
2012 tracing study of COM graduates from 2006 to 2012 (Mandeville
et al., 2014b). The probability that doctors exit the health labour
market increases over the time horizon, with values informed by a 2006
tracing study of all COM graduates from 1991 (Zijlstra and Broadhead,
2007).
Once in the medical oﬃcer state, doctors remain there unless they
exit into one of the absorbing states or enter specialty training. The
transition probabilities for exiting Malawi and the public sector were
also informed by the 2012 tracing study, with the latter shown to be
lower for medical oﬃcers than for interns. The probability of transi-
tioning to specialty training in the baseline scenario was informed by
MOH and COM administrative data (see technical appendix). The
probability of entering specialty training under diﬀerent policy inter-
ventions was informed by results from a discrete choice experiment (see
below).
If a policy intervention involves a mandatory service period before
training, doctors ﬁrst enter a “pre-training medical oﬃcer” state for the
required number of cycles before starting training. This is a tunnel state,
i.e. a temporary state that can last a number of cycles but cannot be
exited during this period.
Doctors undertaking specialty training are known in Malawi as re-
gistrars. There are three registrar states in the model, depending on the
location of training. As most registrars training outside Malawi under
government funding are sent to South Africa, this country was used in
the model. Thus, a “Malawi registrar” trains fully in Malawi, a “South
Africa registrar” trains fully in South Africa and a “sandwich registrar”
undertakes training split between Malawi and South Africa. The allo-
cation between these states in the baseline scenario was based on cur-
rent training patterns. All three states are modelled as four-cycle tunnel
states, which is the standard length of specialty training programmes
for clinical specialties. Only time spent in Malawi counted towards the
outcome measures.
All registrars then enter one of three specialist states, depending on
the location of their training: “Malawi specialist”, “South Africa spe-
cialist” or “sandwich specialist”. Most specialists in Malawi are em-
ployed in the public sector even if they undertake dual practice.
Therefore we have assumed that no specialist exits the public sector,
although they may exit Malawi or the health labour market. We used
limited data on the current location of specialists trained in the last ten
years to estimate the risk of exiting Malawi for specialists trained in
diﬀerent locations. We anticipated this value to decline over time both
within a cohort, as job mobility diminishes in later career (Padarath
et al., 2003; Tjadens et al., 2012), and also over cohorts, due a likely
“magnet eﬀect”. This reﬂects the positive inﬂuence of a growing
Fig. 1. Model ﬁgure.
SA = South Africa; absorbing states in black; tunnel states in grey;
all other temporary states in white; transition probabilities shown
and explained further in technical appendix; grey lines and text
indicate transition probabilities aﬀected by policy interventions; A
= 1- EMI -EPSI –EHLM; B= 1- ET - T M - T MSA - T SA -EMMO - EPSMO
–EHLM; C = 1 – EHLM; D = 1- EMG - EPSG – EHLM; E = 1- EMM
–EHLM; F = 1- EMMSA –EHLM; G = 1- EMSA –EHLM.
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specialist workforce on retention of new specialists due to role model-
ling and greater opportunities for professional interaction (Bailey et al.,
2012).
To distinguish medical oﬃcers from more senior doctors who have
not specialised, we also created a “generalist” state. This represents
doctors working in central and district facilities, as well as adminis-
trative positions. It also incorporates doctors working as general prac-
titioners, as specialty training in general practice (family medicine) has
only recently been established in Malawi. All doctors still in the medical
oﬃcer state after six years will transition into the generalist state
(modelled as a transition probability of one at the end of cycle 7).
Although doctors could still seek and enter specialty training in their
later working life, it is far less common than in the early career period.
Therefore, generalists remain as generalists unless they enter one of the
absorbing states. The transition probabilities for exiting Malawi and the
public sector for generalists also decline over time, with the initial value
equal to those for the medical oﬃcer state.
The main structural assumptions of the model are as follows. As in
the norm in medical careers, doctors can only progress up the profes-
sional hierarchy and cannot return to a more junior position. For sim-
plicity, it is assumed that doctors do not go straight into specialty
training on completion of internship, although this does occur de facto.
Transition to training occurs at the end of one cycle for a cohort rather
than throughout the junior doctor period. All registrars are assumed to
complete their training within four years without dropping out. All
registrars return to Malawi for at least one year of practice as a spe-
cialist after completion of training. Junior doctors who do not enter
specialty training within seven years of qualifying do not enter it later
in their careers. Finally, the “exit public sector” state was modelled as
an absorbing rather than temporary state. Repeated movement between
sectors is uncommon in Malawi, with health workers reporting strong
barriers to returning to the public sector after exit (Muula and Maseko,
2005). This is compounded in a hierarchical cadre such as medicine,
where re-entry risks a loss of seniority and/or status. The most ﬂexible
period is likely to be early career, yet examination of employment data
collected on Malawian junior doctors showed that no doctor had re-
turned to the public sector after a job outside it. Although data were not
available to conﬁrm this assumption for the entire medical workforce,
there was suﬃcient justiﬁcation to model an exit from the public sector
as an absorbing state for these purposes. However, barriers to re-entry
into the public sector – both for those outside the public sector and
emigrant doctors – may lessen over the time horizon, therefore the
durability of the absorbing states over the time horizon is also a strong
assumption of this model.
3.2. Policy interventions
The policy interventions all expand specialty training so that there
are suﬃcient places available for all junior doctors who are willing to
take up this training. They diﬀer in the location of this expanded
training (all in Malawi, “sandwich” i.e. split between Malawi and South
Africa, or all in South Africa), and whether it is combined with a
mandatory service period before commencing training of two, three,
four or ﬁve years in Malawi. These combinations result in 15 alter-
natives to be compared to the baseline scenario (listed in Table 1).
The eﬀectiveness of each intervention is taken as the uptake of
available training places by medical oﬃcers. These were based on
predictions from a discrete choice experiment that quantiﬁed the pre-
ferences of junior doctors in Malawi for diﬀerent types of specialty
training (Mandeville et al., 2016b). Junior doctors were asked to choose
between two jobs: both guaranteeing a specialty training place, but
with training diﬀering in location, the number of years of mandatory
service and the specialty itself. As the potential of expanding specialty
training as an incentive to retain doctors was the primary focus of this
study rather than the choice of specialty, a constant ratio of popular to
unpopular specialties (also examined in the study) was used to predict
uptake. The predicted uptake rates can be found in the technical ap-
pendix and form the transition probabilities between medical oﬃcer
and registrar (TM, TMSA, TSA) or medical oﬃcer to medical oﬃcer before
training (ETM2-5, ETMSA2-5, ETSA2-5). Those who opt out of the posts on
oﬀer remain in the medical oﬃcer state, but are subjected to the
background transition probabilities to the absorbing states before
transitioning to the generalist state. These uptake rates were assumed to
be constant over the time horizon.
3.3. Model population
To explore the cumulative impact of diﬀerent policy scenarios, the
model followed 40 successive cohorts of Malawian doctors, with each
cohort entering one cycle after the preceding cohort. All cohorts start in
the intern state. The number of graduates at COM has increased from 13
in 1992 to 69 in 2014, with annual enrolment averaging 99 over the
past ﬁve years. The size of the ﬁrst cohort was therefore set as 100. As
medical student numbers are likely to rise further over the next 40
years, each subsequent cohort was expanded by ﬁve graduates leading
to a ﬁnal cohort size of 295.
The existing stock of Malawian doctors was also incorporated in the
model. We used data from previous tracing studies of Malawian doctors
and also the Medical Council of Malawi to inform the distribution of
these doctors across model states in cycle 1 (see technical appendix).
3.4. Cost estimates
There are two types of cost relevant here: in-service costs and spe-
cialty training costs. These incorporate the direct costs of training and
employing more doctors and specialists and are summarised below,
with further details and all values set out in the technical appendix.
Indirect costs such as the administrative burden of policy im-
plementation or increased service costs associated with more specialist
medical activity were deemed either negligible compared to the direct
costs or too diﬃcult to attribute directly to the policy intervention ra-
ther than the general needs of the health service.
The major in-service costs comprise salaries and government pen-
sion contributions. The most recent MOH salary scales were used to
estimate salaries within each state, combined with a 10% uplift to cover
pension contributions. All public sector doctors are also entitled to
subsidised accommodation. Data on government rental costs for doc-
tors’ housing were collected in order to estimate an average cost across
states. Specialists in Malawi also receive a one-oﬀ allowance for a ve-
hicle and monthly allowances for fuel and communication costs. Interns
and medical oﬃcers are also provided transport to and from work.
The MOH pays for specialty training, whether in Malawi or South
Africa. In Malawi, the MOH pays the COM tuition fees for specialty
training programmes. In South Africa, the MOH pays the tuition fees of
South African universities for each year that Malawian registrars are in
South Africa. Four universities have taken Malawian registrars in the
past: University of Cape Town, University of the Witwatersrand,
University of Pretoria and University of KwaZulu-Natal. The mean of
relevant fees for Malawian doctors in specialty training programmes at
these universities was used to represent annual tuition fees in South
Africa. We also incorporated various allowances paid to registrars in
Malawi and South Africa in recent funded training places.
3.5. Modelling cost-eﬀectiveness and sensitivity analysis
The model was constructed using Microsoft Excel 2013, following
the approach of Briggs et al., and is available as a supplementary ﬁle
(Briggs et al., 2006). A discount rate of 3% was applied to both costs
and eﬀects. A probabilistic sensitivity analysis was carried out to ac-
count for uncertainty in the input parameters. Here, the value of each
parameter is considered to be random rather than ﬁxed, with an asso-
ciated probability distribution. The distribution employed for each
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parameter followed standard practice in health economics (Briggs et al.,
2006). 2000 Monte Carlo simulations were used to draw values from
these distributions, with the mean used to examine the distribution of
doctors across diﬀerent states in the model, as well as compute the
average costs and eﬀects for each intervention. The latter were used to
calculate the incremental cost-eﬀectiveness ratio (ICER) for each in-
tervention compared to the baseline scenario, calculated for both
doctor-years and specialist-years.
As an intuitive alternative to conﬁdence intervals around ICERs, we
calculated cost-eﬀectiveness acceptability frontiers (CEAF) over zero to
MWK50 million in increments of MWK100,000. CEAFs identify the
optimal option (i.e. that with the highest net monetary beneﬁt) over a
range of cost-eﬀectiveness thresholds and then plot the probability that
this option is cost-eﬀective over all values. MWK amounts were ex-
pressed in international dollars using 2015 data (World Bank, 2016).
3.6. Threshold value by outcome measure
Current suggested cost-eﬀectiveness thresholds for LMIC are based
on disability-adjusted life-years averted (Tan-Torres Edejer et al.,
2003). As outlined above, the outcomes in this analysis are not easily
expressed in population health terms. andWe therefore used an alter-
native strategy to identify the threshold that the Malawian government
is currently willing to pay for a doctor- and specialist-year by using the
data here to calculate the net present value of the discounted costs of an
“average” doctor working for 40 years in the public sector (see tech-
nical appendix).
3.7. Subgroup analysis
The discrete choice experiment identiﬁed four subgroups with
substantially diﬀerent preferences with regard to specialty training
(Mandeville et al., 2016b). These were characterised as:
(i) “rich rejecters” (high current salary, frequently refused the hy-
pothetical jobs in the public sector oﬀered to them);
(ii) “money motivated” (greatest preference for salary increases);
(iii) “stubborn specialists” (strong training preferences with little ﬂex-
ibility);
(iv) “pliant patriots” (most ﬂexible training preferences, least disutility
from training in Malawi).
As these preferences aﬀected the predicted uptake of training places
(see technical appendix), we ran separate analyses for each subgroup to
assess the impact of this heterogeneity on the cost-eﬀectiveness of the
policy interventions.
Ethical approval
Ethical approval for this study was obtained from the COM Research
and Ethics Committee of the University of Malawi (P.09/11/1129) and
the London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine (6042).
4. Results
4.1. Distributions across states
The impact of diﬀerent policy interventions can be seen from the
distribution of doctors across model states over the time horizon. Fig. 2
shows the progression of the ﬁrst cohort of doctors in the baseline
compared to an illustrative policy intervention of expanded training in
Malawi. At the end of year 6, specialists start to complete their training
leading to a rise in their number in the public sector. However, without
the magnet eﬀect of a professional community, many of these specia-
lists leave Malawi by the end of the time horizon. The distribution of all
doctors in the model (existing stock and all 40 cohorts) is also shown in
Fig. 2. With expanded specialty training in Malawi, the medical
workforce would be over 50% greater and the number of specialists in
Malawi more than six times that of baseline at the end of the time
horizon. The number of doctors outside Malawi is roughly equal,
however fewer doctors exit the public sector under expanded training
compared to baseline.
4.2. Average costs and eﬀects
Total doctor-years and specialist-years for each intervention as a
proportion of baseline are shown in Table 1, with values and total costs
in the technical appendix. Expanding Malawi or sandwich training with
or without mandatory service results in greater doctor- and specialist-
years than baseline, whereas expanding training in South Africa in any
form actually reduces total doctor-years (by over a ﬁfth without any
service). The greatest gains in doctor-years (17%) and specialist-years
(516%) would come from expanding sandwich training without any
service.
When total costs are broken down into diﬀerent cost categories,
salaries constitute between 74 and 80% of spending and training costs
just 1–2% across most interventions (see technical appendix). The ex-
ceptions are interventions without any mandatory service, where
training rises to 7–8% and salaries drop to 62–65%. A more substantial
cost arising from expanded specialty training is the “perks” provided to
qualiﬁed specialists, particularly the monthly fuel allowance, running
from 7 to 19% of total costs.
4.3. Threshold value by outcome measure
Using the available data to calculate the net present value of the
discounted costs of both an “average” doctor and a specialist working
for 40 years in the public sector, we calculated that the Malawian
government currently values a doctor-year at MWK5.5 million (intl.
$34,700) and a specialist-year at MWK7.9 million (intl. $50,300).
4.4. Cost-eﬀectiveness acceptability frontiers
The incremental eﬀects, costs and ICERs for all interventions for the
whole population and by subgroup are provided in the technical ap-
pendix. ICERs, however, do not reﬂect well the uncertainty associated
with the cost-eﬀectiveness of an intervention, which are better dis-
played by CEAFs (Fig. 3). For both doctor- and specialist-years, the
optimal option above baseline is expanded training in Malawi with
some mandatory service. If the government is willing to pay between
MWK 19.8 and 30.1 million (Intl. $126,000 to 191,600) per doctor-
year, the optimal option is expanded Malawi training with ﬁve years'
mandatory service, although there is uncertainty whether this is more
cost-eﬀective than expanded sandwich training at this threshold. If the
government is willing to pay between MWK 10.5 and 15.7 million (Intl.
$66,800 to 99,000) per specialist-year, the optimal option with high
certainty is expanded Malawi training with two years’ mandatory ser-
vice.
The most cost-eﬀective policy intervention to increase doctor-years,
expanding Malawian training with ﬁve years’ mandatory service, would
therefore require the government to be willing to pay three and a half
times the current spending on a doctor-year. To expand the specialist
workforce most cost-eﬀectively, the government would need to be
willing to pay a third more than current spending on a specialist-year.
4.5. Subgroup analysis
The only two subgroups that showed substantial diﬀerences to the
whole population were the pliant patriots and the rich rejecters. Pliant
patriots had the highest uptake rates of training for all locations and all
lengths of mandatory service. Expanded training in Malawi would lead
to a greater number of doctor- and specialist-years than for the whole
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population with any length of mandatory service, including a potential
8.5-fold increase in specialist-years with no service requirement
(Table 1). The optimal options are the same as for the whole popula-
tion, although the greater uptake of training places leads to slightly
higher thresholds of MWK 20.5 million (Intl. $ 130,500) per doctor-
year and MWK 11.5 million (Intl. $73,200) per specialist-year. For rich
rejecters, the optimal option is expanded Malawi training with two
years’ mandatory service, which is cost-saving over baseline with an
ICER of MWK -43.4 million (Int.$276,500) per doctor-year and MWK
-21.2 million (Int.$134,900) per specialist-year.
5. Discussion
The ﬁndings of this economic evaluation show that the Malawian
government could obtain higher returns on their investment in medical
education by expanding specialty training in Malawi. Funding more
doctors to train exclusively outside Malawi will lead to less return than
current policies. At least two years of mandatory service in the public
sector before training in Malawi would be more cost-eﬀective, with ﬁve
years adding the most value in terms of doctor-years. For doctors who
are likely to leave the public sector after internship, two years of
mandatory service would be cost-saving over current policies. After 40
years of expanded training in Malawi, the medical workforce would be
over 50% larger and there would be over six times the number of
specialists compared to current trends. These policies, however, would
be more costly than current government spending for relatively modest
gains in doctor-years. The government would need to be willing to pay
at least 3.5 times more per doctor-year for a 5% increase in total doctor-
Fig. 2. Distributions across states over time.
A. Distribution of ﬁrst cohort of doctors across
states over time horizon. B. Distribution of all
cohorts over time horizon.
Table 1
Eﬀects as proportion of baseline for whole population and subgroups.
Policy interventiona Doctor-years
as proportion of baseline
Specialist-years
as proportion of baseline
WP RR SS MM PP WP RR SS MM PP
Expanded Malawi training 1.07 1.02 1.07 1.08 1.12 5.90 2.61 5.49 6.00 8.52
Expanded sandwich training 1.17 1.10 1.17 1.18 1.23 6.16 3.76 5.86 6.22 7.87
Expanded South Africa training 0.78 0.87 0.79 0.76 0.72 5.80 3.76 5.59 6.29 7.03
Expanded Malawi training + 2 years 1.07 1.01 1.07 1.08 1.13 3.96 1.22 3.81 4.01 6.10
Expanded sandwich training + 2 years 1.01 1.00 1.01 1.01 1.01 4.47 1.61 4.46 4.70 6.17
Expanded South Africa training + 2 years 0.89 0.98 0.89 0.87 0.85 4.11 1.58 4.08 4.73 5.29
Expanded Malawi training + 3 years 1.07 1.00 1.07 1.07 1.12 3.22 0.96 3.13 3.26 4.90
Expanded sandwich training + 3 years 1.02 1.01 1.02 1.02 1.03 3.65 1.06 3.68 3.86 5.16
Expanded South Africa training + 3 years 0.93 1.00 0.93 0.91 0.90 3.39 1.11 3.43 3.97 4.38
Expanded Malawi training + 4 years 1.06 1.00 1.06 1.07 1.11 2.63 0.88 2.55 2.67 3.85
Expanded sandwich training + 4 years 1.03 1.01 1.03 1.04 1.05 2.98 0.85 3.02 3.19 4.14
Expanded South Africa training + 4 years 0.96 1.01 0.96 0.95 0.94 2.82 0.87 2.90 3.35 3.57
Expanded Malawi training + 5 years 1.05 1.00 1.05 1.05 1.09 2.10 0.88 2.10 2.15 2.92
Expanded sandwich training + 5 years 1.04 1.00 1.04 1.04 1.05 2.39 0.72 2.50 2.60 3.18
Expanded South Africa training + 5 years 0.99 1.01 0.98 0.98 0.98 2.31 0.81 2.38 2.77 2.77
Notes: WP = whole population; RR = rich rejecters; SS = stubborn specialists; MM = money motivated; PP = pliant patriots.
a Years refer to number of years of mandatory service for that intervention.
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years and a third more per specialist-year for a four-fold increase.
Greater returns would be possible from those doctors with more ﬂexible
preferences.
This is the ﬁrst evaluation, to our knowledge, of the cost-eﬀective-
ness of specialty training for retaining doctors in LMIC. By including
two outcome measures, this study recognises the often divergent ob-
jectives in health workforce policy and provides more information for
stakeholders. This study demonstrates the impact of predictable ﬁnan-
cing of specialty training on Malawi's specialist workforce in compar-
ison to the current ad hoc funding. It provides a realistic assessment of
the costs of these policies compared to current government spending.
Finally, while mandatory service has been considered in Malawi in light
of the heavy subsidy of undergraduate medical training (Muula and
Maseko, 2005), this study is the ﬁrst to establish its cost-eﬀectiveness.
Whilst compulsory service is often defaulted on when linked to ﬁ-
nancial incentives (Bärnighausen and Bloom, 2009), its stipulation as
an entry requirement to specialty training is more feasible and common
in other countries (Frehywot et al., 2010).
The cost-eﬀectiveness analysis by Lagarde et al. also used a discrete
choice experiment to establish the eﬀectiveness of diﬀerent incentive
policies, but its focus was on the recruitment and retention of South
African nurses to rural areas (Lagarde et al., 2012). Although the dif-
ferent scope limits any comparison with the results obtained here, this
study did ﬁnd that oﬀering nurses study leave to specialise was more
cost-eﬀective than ﬁnancial incentives alone. Overall, an “upstream”
intervention of recruiting more nurses from rural areas was the most
cost-eﬀective option. This echoes our ﬁndings in the pliant patriots
subgroup, who were more likely to accept specialty training in Malawi
than the overall population - although this greater acceptance led to a
slightly higher cost-eﬀectiveness threshold. Junior doctors in this sub-
group required the least compensation to train all in Malawi and were
the only subgroup for whom training outside Africa did not signiﬁcantly
inﬂuence their choices (Mandeville et al., 2016b). They also tended to
be older than their peers and earned less on average, so these more
ﬂexible preferences may reﬂect an increasing pragmatism about any
training places on oﬀer. Their acceptance of training in Malawi, how-
ever, may be shared by more junior doctors as the COM training pro-
grammes become better established. Methodologically, our study sub-
stantially extends this study through more complex modelling,
incorporating the existing stock of Malawian doctors, representing a
magnet eﬀect through cohort-dependent transition probabilities, and
distinguishing health workers with diﬀerent levels of human capital.
We also provide the model ﬁle to aid other researchers.
It is important to recognise the scale of the challenge facing the
health workforce in Malawi. Our model, which provides the most ro-
bust forecast of Malawi's medical workforce to date, shows that the
optimal option would expand the number of doctors by 50% by the end
of the time period. Yet Malawi's population is predicted to increase by
170% over the next 40 years (United Nations, 2015). Any gains in in-
creased production and retention of doctors will be quickly outweighed
by population growth, unless consideration is given to complementary
policies such as expansion in undergraduate training or other cadres
Fig. 3. Cost-eﬀectiveness acceptability frontiers.
A. Cost-eﬀectiveness acceptability frontiers for doctor-years and specialist-years for whole population. B. Cost-eﬀectiveness acceptability frontiers for doctor-years and specialist-years for
rich rejecters subgroup.
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such as clinical oﬃcers. Future cost-eﬀectiveness analyses examining
the optimal mix of health workers would be useful in this regard.
There are several limitations to this analysis. First, we took a gov-
ernment rather than a societal perspective, thus disregarding any wel-
fare produced by doctors working outside the public sector. The stock of
doctors in Malawi is so small that clearly the labour of all doctors is of
social value, yet the largest disease burden exists in rural areas with
80% of the population. As the vast majority of facilities in rural areas
are public rather than private, a government perspective captures the
doctor-years holding the most marginal value for Malawi's population.
Although the availability of several tracing studies led to more data to
inform the model than in comparable studies (Lagarde et al., 2012), a
wider range of data sources would have enabled more accurate model
parameters and investigation of assumptions. For example, we did not
have information to model the eﬀect of expanded training on exit rates
from Malawi and the public sector (i.e. cross-elasticities of the demand
for training places) or the likely changes in doctors' preferences for
training places over a 40-year period. Probabilistic sensitivity analysis
will have accounted for this uncertainty to some degree. Finally, the
eﬀectiveness measures were derived from stated preferences and
therefore can only be a guide to what doctors will accept in reality. For
example, despite junior doctors indicating that they would accept ﬁve
years of service in exchange for guaranteed specialty training, such a
period may be diﬃcult to implement and two years is likely to be more
pragmatic.
With regard to specialty training, our reliance on tuition fees may
have underestimated the true cost of providing training. Larger num-
bers of registrars are likely to be easily absorbed by the extensive
medical educational system in South Africa, whereas more teaching
staﬀ would be required in Malawi (this would be the main associated
cost as most specialties are taught via apprenticeship-style training in
central hospitals). These posts are likely to be ﬁlled by expatriate
doctors until suﬃcient Malawian specialists were trained, with ex-
penses covered by the Malawian government and development part-
ners. However, training was a small percentage of costs across all al-
ternatives and therefore this is unlikely to be a substantive source of
bias. For these purposes, we also disregarded concerns over the quality
of specialty training that can be provided in Malawi without exposure
to more advanced health systems. Similar concerns were raised when
the medical school in Malawi was established and shown later to be
without basis (Broadhead and Muula, 2002). Although we did not
compare the expansion of training against purely ﬁnancial interven-
tions in this analysis, non-ﬁnancial incentives are likely to be more
tenable to the Malawian government in the short-term given the ﬁ-
nancial burden imposed by previous salary increases and current ﬁscal
constraints (Mandeville and Muula, 2016).
In conclusion, this study has shown that expanding specialty
training in Malawi is more cost-eﬀective than training outside Malawi,
despite being less valued by junior doctors. This policy direction will
enlarge the specialist workforce substantially and obtain the most value
from investment in undergraduate medical education, however will
require increasing current spending levels. Implementation of this
policy will need to take into account the existing and future skill mix of
specialists in Malawi, as well as the likely need to incentivise unpopular
but priority specialties such as ophthalmology (Mandeville et al.,
2016b). The incentives oﬀered to returning specialists will also need to
be reviewed as the workforce expands, given that these accounted for
up to a ﬁfth of spending. The general conclusions from this study, rather
than the speciﬁc ICERs, are likely to be transferable to other sub-Sa-
haran African countries seeking to maximise the value from their in-
vestment in medical undergraduate education. Future research to reﬁne
the model would be welcomed, particularly in settings with more data
available to clarify the assumptions employed here. Yet even in settings
with less data, more routine application of cost-eﬀectiveness analyses to
health workforce decisions is likely to be of considerable value.
Appendix A. Supplementary data
Supplementary data related to this article can be found at http://dx.
doi.org/10.1016/j.socscimed.2017.10.012.
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